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This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political
organizations. We formally show that the PFS model predicts that the quantile regression of the protection
measure on the inverse import penetration ratio divided by the import demand elasticity, should yield
a positive coefficient for quantiles close to one. We test this prediction using the data from Gawande
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There has been much interest in the political economy aspects of trade policy recently. In
part, this has been triggered by the easy to use theoretical framework in the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) "Protection for Sale" model (hereafter the PFS model). Empirical studies,
such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), have shown that
as predicted by the PFS framework, protection is positively related to the import penetration
ratio for politically unorganized industries, but negatively for politically organized ones.
Thus, a key explanatory variable in estimating the PFS model is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the industry is politically organized. We argue that this variable is hard to
construct in a satisfactory manner and how, because of this, existing tests of the PFS model
may be compromised. We then propose and implement a new test that does not require such
classi￿cations to be made. Nor does it require data on contributions made to political parties,
data which is available for the US but is not usually available for other countries, which limit
the applicability of existing tests.
Our approach exploits the following prediction of the PFS model: politically organized indus-
tries should have higher protection than unorganized ones given the inverse import penetration
ratio and other control variables. This suggests that industries with higher protection are more
likely to be politically organized, and thus for these industries, we should expect a positive re-
lationship between the inverse import penetration ratio and the protection measure. Thus, in a
quantile regression, we should see this relationship hold for the higher quantiles. We ￿nd that,
contrary to much of the literature, our new test does not provide empirical support for the PFS
model.
What is the problem in classifying industries as organized or not? Past studies using US data
have encountered the following problem: while only politically organized industries are assumed
2to make campaign contributions in the PFS model, the data indicate that all industries make
Political Action Committees￿(PAC) contributions. Thus, if one follows the assumptions in the
PFS model that organized industries lobby while unorganized ones do not, all industries should
be classi￿ed as politically organized. But in this case, the PFS model predicts the equilibrium
level of protection will be lower than when only industries with contributions above a positive
level are taken as organized. In fact, in the small country case, if all industries are taken to
be organized, and all agents own some of at most one factor, the equilibrium tari⁄ equals the
optimal one, namely zero.
To overcome this problem, past studies have used some simple rules for classi￿cation. Gold-
berg and Maggi (1999) classi￿ed an industry as politically organized if its PAC contribution
is greater than a pre-speci￿ed threshold level. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) used a
regression-based procedure. Their procedure is based on the idea that if industries are politi-
cally organized, then industries with higher import penetration ratios are likely to make higher
campaign contributions.1
Several questions naturally arise about these classi￿cation rules. First, are their rules con-
sistent with the PFS model? Second, do their rules correctly distinguish between politically
organized and unorganized industries? And if there are classi￿cation errors, would that lead to
bias in the parameter estimates of the PFS model?
In this paper, we argue against their classi￿cation rules. We formally derive the equilibrium
relationship between campaign contributions and the inverse import penetration ratio. We
1More recently, a second generation of empirical studies has taken a di⁄erent approach to reconciling theory
and the data. For example, Ederington and Minier (2005) extend the PFS model by hypothesizing that industries
can lobby for both trade and domestic policies. In their model, it is possible that some industries are politically
unorganized for trade policies and yet make contributions for domestic policies. Matschke (2006) takes a similar
approach. Since the models by Ederington and Minier (2005) and by Matschke (2006) are more comprehensive
than the PFS model, the authors impose additional assumptions to make the models tractable for estimation.
3then use the theoretical result to provide a simple numerical example of the PFS model where
the level of the industry￿ s contribution varies greatly depending on its import penetration.
Speci￿cally, politically organized industries may make very small contributions if their import
penetration is high. This implies that using a particular threshold of campaign contribution
as a device to distinguish between politically organized and unorganized industries as is done
in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) results in mis-classi￿cation and is inconsistent with the PFS
model. Furthermore, in our numerical example, import penetration and equilibrium campaign
contributions are negatively correlated. This is exactly the opposite of the relationship that is
assumed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and most papers using their data; when the
import penetration and the PAC contributions per value added are positively correlated, they
classify industries as politically organized. We argue that if we were to reclassify the politically
organized industries, then their parameter estimates no longer support the PFS hypothesis.
We also argue that due to classi￿cation error, the estimation strategies used in Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) cannot provide consistent estimates.
Estimation of the PFS model involves regressing a trade protection measure on the inverse import
penetration ratio and its interaction term with the political organization dummy. The inverse
import penetration ratio should be treated as an endogenous regressor, as has been discussed
in the literature (e.g., Tre￿ er, 1993). Potential mis-classi￿cation of industries makes it even
more challenging to estimate the PFS model, since the political organization dummy would also
be econometrically endogenous in the presence of classi￿cation error. As Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) were both fully aware of these problems, they
used an IV strategy which, at a ￿rst glance, appears to provide consistent estimates. This paper
shows that if the PFS model is true, then the existence of the classi￿cation error results in the
disturbance term in the estimating equation being a function of the inverse import penetration
ratio. It is therefore impossible to ￿nd an instrument that is correlated with the inverse import
4penetration ratio and uncorrelated with the disturbance term as needed.
In sum, we argue that if we are to structurally estimate the PFS model using the data used
by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), we should not use
an arbitrary classi￿cation scheme along with the campaign contributions to generate political
organization dummies. The structural estimation and testing of the PFS model would require
treatment of the political organization dummies to be fully consistent with the prediction of the
PFS model. To our knowledge, this has not been done in the literature.
Given the shortcomings of the classi￿cation rules used in the literature, an approach, such
as ours, that does not require such a classi￿cation to be made has obvious advantages. Since, as
we show below, our approach relies on the relationship between observables (i.e., the protection
measure, import penetration, and import demand elasticity) implied by the PFS model, it is
entirely consistent with the PFS framework. Moreover, since our estimating equation does not
require classi￿cation of industries into organized and unorganized ones our approach is free from
the risk of mis-classi￿cation. Furthermore, our approach expands the realm of testing the PFS
model, as it is applicable for many countries where contribution data are unavailable.
We use quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and more recent work on instru-
mental variable (IV) quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a; 2004b; 2006) to
empirically test the predictions of the PFS model in a quantile IV famework using the same
data as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). We ￿nd that the estimated relationship is nega-
tive instead of positive, and insigni￿cant, casting serious doubt on the validity of the PFS model.
We then discuss several possible explanations for the results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the PFS model
and past empirical studies. Section 3 details our approach to testing the PFS model. Section
4 brie￿ y describes the data used in this study. Section 5 presents the estimation results. In
Section 6, we further discuss our results. Section 7 concludes.
52 The PFS Model and Its Estimation in the Literature
2.1 The PFS Model
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994). There is a
continuum of individuals, each of in￿nitesimal size. Each individual has preferences that are
linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and are additively separable across all goods.
As a result, there are no income e⁄ects and no cross price e⁄ects in demand which comes from
equating marginal utility to own price. On the production side, there is perfect competition in a
speci￿c factor setting: each good is produced by a factor speci￿c to the industry, ki in industry i,
and a mobile factor, labor, L. Thus, each speci￿c factor is the residual claimant in its industry.
Some industries are organized, and being organized or not is exogenous to the model. Tari⁄
revenue is redistributed to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners of the speci￿c factors in
organized industries make up the lobby group which can make contributions to the government
to in￿ uence policy if it raises their total welfare. Government cares about both the contributions
made to it and social welfare and puts a relative weight of ￿ on social welfare, W(p) where p is
the domestic price and equals the tari⁄ vector plus the world price p￿.2
The timing of the game is as follows: ￿rst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution functions
that specify the contributions made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which determines
domestic prices). The government then chooses what to do to maximize its own objective
function. In this way, the government is the common agent all principals (organized lobbies)
are trying to in￿ uence. Such games are known to have a continuum of equilibria. By restricting
agents to bids that are ￿truthful￿so that their bids have the same curvature as their welfare, a
unique equilibrium can be obtained.3 The equilibrium outcome in this unique equilibrium is as if
2We use bold letters for vectors.
3For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The working paper version of
this paper provides a new elementary proof of their result.
6the government was maximizing a weighted social welfare function with a greater weight on the
welfare of organized industries. In other words, equilibrium tari⁄s can be found by maximizing




where J0 is the set of politically organized industries.
In their model, the welfare of the lobby group in industry j is




where ￿j(pj) is producer surplus in industry j; lj is labor income of the owners of the speci￿c
factors employed in industry j, wage is unity, Nj=N = ￿j is the fraction of agents who own the
speci￿c factor j, while T(p) + S(p) is the sum of tari⁄ revenue and consumer surplus in the
economy. Maximizing G(p) gives, after some manipulation4:
xj(pj)(Ij ￿ ￿L) + (pj ￿ p￿
j)m0
j(pj)(￿ + ￿L) = 0, (1)
where Ij is unity if j is organized and zero otherwise, ￿L (assuming that each individual owns
at most one speci￿c factor) corresponds to the fraction of the population that owns the speci￿c
capital of organized industries, zj = xj(pj)=mj(pj) where xj(pj) and mj(pj) denote the supply
and imports of industry j; while ej = ￿m0
j(pj)pj=mj(pj). Rewriting equation (1) using the fact
that (pj ￿ p￿
j) = tjp￿






















Note that ￿ = [￿￿L=(￿ + ￿L)] < 0, ￿ = 1=(￿ + ￿L) > 0, and ￿ + ￿ > 0 as long as there are
some agents who do not own any speci￿c capital of organized industries, ￿L < 1; protection
4See the working paper version of this paper for details.
7is positively related to zj=ej if the industry is politically organized, but otherwise negatively
related to it.
2.2 A Problem in Estimation ￿ the Classi￿cation of Industries










The error term, ￿j, is interpreted as the composite of variables potentially a⁄ecting protection
that may have been left out and the measurement error of the dependent variable. To allow for
the fact that a signi￿cant fraction of industries have zero protection in the data, equation (3)














To test the key prediction (i.e., ￿ < 0, ￿ > 0 and ￿ + ￿ > 0), equations (3) and (4) have
been estimated in a number of previous studies (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay, 2000; McCalman, 2004).5
Although data on the measure of trade protection, the import penetration ratio, and the
import-demand elasticities are often available, it is harder to de￿ne whether an industry is polit-
ically organized or not. To deal with this problem, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) (GM from here
on) used data on campaign contributions at the three-digit SIC industry level. An industry is
categorized to be politically organized if the campaign contribution exceeds a speci￿ed threshold
5Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and others note that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 0, and ￿ + ￿ > 0 are only necessary conditions
for the validity of the PFS speci￿cation. However, the literature appears to take the right sign of the coe¢ cients
of the protection equation as strong empirical support of the PFS paradigm. Recently, Imai et al. (2008) criticize
this by pointing out that even when estimating the PFS equation on an arti￿cial data simulated from a simple
non-optimizing model without a PFS element, one obtains parameter estimates consistent with the PFS model.
This suggests that to truly test the PFS model, other implications of the model need to be considered.
8level. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (GB from here on) used a di⁄erent procedure for
classi￿cation. They run a regression where the dependent variable is the log of the corporate
PAC spending per contributing ￿rm relative to value added and the regressors include the inter-
action of the import penetration from ￿ve countries into the sub-industry and the two-digit SIC
dummies. Industries are classi￿ed as politically organized if any of the coe¢ cients on its ￿ve
interaction terms are found to be positive. This procedure is based on the idea that in organized
industries, an increase in contributions would likely occur when import penetration increased.
Both these procedures are questionable.6 Below we o⁄er a formal argument that claims:
(1) in estimating the protection equation, mis-classi￿cation of industries results in inconsistent
parameter estimates; (2) both of the above classi￿cation approaches are inconsistent with the
PFS model and result in mis-classi￿cation of industries.
Notice that the classi￿cation error results in the error term in the estimating equation (3)
being ￿j + ￿￿jzj=ej where ￿j is the classi￿cation error. Since the error term is a function of
zj=ej, any variable correlated with the inverse import penetration ratio cannot be used as an
instrument, which makes the instrumenting of the term zj=ej impossible. For the same reason,
instruments for political organization should not be correlated with zj=ej, but GM and GB use
the same instruments used for zj=ej, which have to be correlated with zj=ej, as instruments for
the political organization dummy as well.
Next, we discuss the second claim. Given the model and the menu auction equilibrium of the
PFS model, it is easy to verify that the equilibrium campaign contribution schedule should be
such that government welfare in equilibrium should equal the maximized value of the government
objective function when industry i is not making any contributions at all. Thus, the equilibrium
6In addition to the arguments below, assuming that all contributions are directed towards in￿ uencing trade
policies may be inappropriate. Also, ignoring other variables that potentially in￿ uence political clout, such as
industry size and electoral districts where the industry is concentrated, is also a potential problem.
9campaign contribution can be expressed as follows:7
B￿











= Hi(p(i)) ￿ Hi(pE), (5)
where B￿
i (pE) is the campaign contribution of industry i at the equilibrium domestic price
vector pE, and p(i) is the vector of domestic price chosen by the government when industry i
is not making any contributions. Since8 Hi(p) = ￿W(p) +
P
j￿J0;j6=i
Wj(p), it can be seen that
equilibrium contributions are essentially the di⁄erence in the value of the function Hi(p) : RN
! R between p(i) and pE.
Let p(t) be a path from pE to p(i) as t goes from zero to unity. Since the line integral is
path independent, we can choose this path as desired. In particular, we can choose it so that
p(t) = pE + t
￿
p(i) ￿ pE￿

















DHi(p(t)) ￿ Dp(t)dt, (6)
where DHi(p(t)) is the vector of partial derivatives of the real valued function Hi(:) with respect
to the vector p and Dp(t) is the vector of the derivatives of p with respect to t and ￿ denotes
their dot product.
The vector p(i) must take the same form as pE (the domestic price chosen by the government
when industry i is making contributions) but with ￿L being replaced by ￿L ￿ ￿i. Thus, for
7As the equilibrium bids of a lobby group equal its welfare of the lobby group less a constant, the constants
will cancel out in the expression below and so are omitted.
8Note that H has to be indexed by i.
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Note the analogy with equation (1). The above allows us to ￿nd p(i) from the data.






































+[I (j 2 L ￿ fig) ￿ (￿L ￿ ￿i)]gxj (pj (t))dt.
Thus, depending on ￿i, ￿, ￿L, xj(:), and zj=ej, B￿
i (pE) can be small even for politically organized
industries.9 Hence, classifying political organization based on a uniform threshold, as done in
GM and others, leads to classi￿cation error.
We provide a simple example, where we assume there are 400 industries (N = 400), of which
200 are politically organized (Np = 200). We set p￿
i = 2:0, ￿ = 50:0, ￿L = 0:508, ￿i = ￿L=N,
and xi = 10000. We also set zi=ei = i=1000 for industries i = 1;:::;Np which are politically
organized and zNp+i=eNp+i = i=1000 for industries Np+i = Np+1;:::;N which are not politically
organized.
In Figure 1, we present the equilibrium campaign contributions for politically organized
industries.10 Notice that the campaign contributions vary from 0 to 40, depending on the
9Below we present a simple example of such a case.
10We did not plot the campaigin contributions of politically unorganized industries becase they obviously are
zero.
11value of z=e. This illustrates the possibility that the GM classi￿cation based on a threshold of
campaign contribution may mis-classify industries with low campaign contribution and low z=e
as politically unorganized.
Figure 1 also shows that the campaign contribution increases with z=e for the politically
organized industries. In other words, for politically organized industries, the campaign con-
tributions are negatively correlated with the import penetration. This is the opposite of the
relationship used by GB to classify political organization. Our example therefore suggests that
the correct organized industries may be the ones which GB classi￿ed as unorganized and vice
versa, i.e., I = 1 ￿ IGB where IGB is the politically organization dummy by GB. This has an
important implication for the interpretation of parameter estimates of equation (3) obtained by
GB: although their estimates seem consistent with the PFS predictions (i.e., ￿GB < 0, ￿GB > 0,
and ￿GB + ￿GB > 0), they are not, given the correct political organization dummy. This can
be easily seen by noticing that when I = 1 ￿ IGB is the political organization dummy, the
protection equation should be
tj
1 + tj
= (￿GB + ￿GB)
zj
ej




This implies b ￿ = ￿GB + ￿GB > 0, b ￿ = ￿￿GB < 0, and b ￿ + b ￿ = ￿GB < 0, which is clearly
inconsistent with the PFS framework.
The positive relationship between campaign contributions and z=e in the simulated model
is in line with the PFS model; it predicts that for politically organized industries, protection is
positively related to z=e and hence campaign contributions and z=e are likely to be positively
related as long as greater campaign contributions tend to result in higher protection. We now
check the relationship in the data. Figure 2 shows the scatterplot where the x-axis is log(z=e)
and y-axis is the log of per value added campaign contributions. This data is exactly what
was used in GB. Figure 3 depicts the scatterplot where the x-axis is log(z=e) and the y-axis is
12the log of campaign contributions, using the data by Facchini et al. (2006) who reconstructed
the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) dataset.11 We use logs to minimize the e⁄ect of outliers. In
both ￿gures, we can see that the relationship between the two is negative. It is needless to
say that these results by no means statistically reject the PFS framework. A more rigorous
estimation and testing exercise of the PFS model using campaign contribution data is left for
future research.
3 A Proposed Approach
3.1 Quantile Regression
In this section, we detail our approach to testing the PFS model. The advantage of our approach
is that it allows us to test the PFS model without an arbitrary classi￿cation of the political
organization. The approach relies heavily on the relationship between observables implied by
the PFS model.
Equation (4) and the restrictions on the coe¢ cients have at least two implications. First,
as has been discussed in the literature, z=e has a negative e⁄ect on the level of protection for
politically unorganized industries while it has a positive e⁄ect for politically organized ones.
Second, given z=e, politically organized industries have higher protection. These implications
lead to the following claim: given z=e, high-protection industries are more likely to be politically
organized and thus the e⁄ect of an increase in z=e on protection tends to be that of politically
organized industries.
The logic of this argument is illustrated in Figure 4 where the distribution of t=(1 + t) is
plotted for given z=e. The variation of t=(1 + t) given z=e occurs for two reasons. First, because
some industries are organized while others are not and these two behave di⁄erently, and second,
11This had to be done as the data of GM has not been made available to other researchers.
13because of the error term. As a result, the distribution of t=(1 + t) comes from a mixture of two
distributions, namely those for the politically organized industries and those for the unorganized.
These two distributions for some given values of z=e are plotted in Figure 4. The two dashed
lines give the conditional expectations of t=(1 + t) for the organized and unorganized industries
as a function of z=e. In line with the PFS model, the two lines start at the same vertical intercept
point and the line for the organized industries is increasing while the other is decreasing in z=e.
For each z=e, if we look at the industries with high t=(1 + t), they tend to be the politically
organized ones. Thus, at high quantiles, the relationship between t=(1 + t) and z=e should be
that for organized industries, i.e., should be increasing as depicted by the solid line labelled the
90th quantile in Figure 4.
The relevant proposition (Proposition 1) and proof can be found in Appendix 1. The propo-
sition essentially states that in the quantile regression of t=(1 +t) on z=e, the coe¢ cient on z=e
should be close to ￿ +￿ > 0 at the quantiles close to ￿ = 1. To empirically examine this, we use
quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and estimate the following equation:
QT (￿jZ) = ￿(￿) + ￿ (￿)Z=10000, (7)
where ￿ denotes quantile, T = t=(1+t), Z = z=e, and QT (￿jZ) is the conditional ￿-th quantile
function of T. If the PFS model is correct, it is expected that ￿ (￿) converges to (￿ + ￿) > 0 as
￿ approaches its highest level of unity from below.
In the quantile regression, Z is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However, Z is likely to
be endogenous as discussed in the literature and hence the parameter estimates of the quantile
regression are likely to be inconsistent. It is therefore important to allow for the potential
endogeneity of Z. We formally show that even in the presence of this endogeneity, the main
prediction of the PFS model in terms of our quantile approach does not change. The relevant
proposition (proposition 2), an analogue of proposition 1, is presented in Appendix 1. To test
14the prediction in the presence of possible endogeneity of Z, we estimate the following equation
by using IV quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a; 2004b; 2006):
P (T ￿ ￿(￿) + ￿ (￿)Z=10000jW) = ￿, (8)
where W is a set of instrumental variables.
Importantly, nowhere in equations (7) and (8) is the political organization dummy present;
these equations involve only variables that are readily available. This way our approach does
not require classi￿cation of industries in any manner and as a result, we can avoid any biases
due to mis-classi￿cation.
An issue that we need to deal with is the endogeneity of political organization. We do so ￿rst
by controlling for capital-labor ratio. This is essentially equivalent to allowing the capital-labor
ratio to be a determining factor for the probability of political organization. This speci￿cation
is motivated by Mitra (1999) who provides a theory of endogenous lobby formation. His model
predicts that among others, industries with higher levels of capital stock are more likely to be
politically organized.
But even after controlling for the capital-labor ratio, there still could remain a correlation
between the error term of the equation determining the political organization and the error term
of equation (4). Since our method is not subject to classi￿cation error, one of the main sources
of correlation between the error terms in the two equations in GM and other studies, we are
less subject to this criticism. In those studies, classi￿cation error enters both the disturbance
term of the equation determining the political organization and the disturbance term of the
protection equation. Thus, classi￿cation error would necessarily result in correlation between
the disturbance terms. Moreover, as long as the error term of the equation determining political
organization and that of the protection equation is positively correlated, or as long as the
negative correlation is not too strong, our quantile IV procedure will still be consistent. This
15is because only when the negative correlation in the errors is very strong (large positive shocks
in protection are correlated with shocks that make an industry unorganized) could the most
protected industries have industries that are not organized. We believe this scenario to be
unlikely.
4 A Brief Description of the Data
We use part of the data used in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).12 The data consist of
242 four-digit SIC industries in the United States. In the dataset, the extent of protection, t;
is measured by the nontari⁄ barrier (NTB) coverage ratio. This is standard procedure in the
literature (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Mitra et al., 2002). z is measured as the inverse
of the ratio of consumption to total imports scaled by 10;000. e is derived from Shiells et al.
(1986) and corrected for measurement error by GB. A brief description of the variables used
in the current study is provided in Table 1. See GB for more details along with the sample
statistics of the variables. Of particular note about the data is that 114 of 242 industries (47%)
have zero protection. This suggests the potential importance of dealing with the corner solution
outcome of T.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Quantile Regression Results
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (7).13 The results do not appear
to provide any supporting evidence for the PFS model; the null hypothesis that ￿ (￿) ￿ 0 cannot
be rejected at high quantiles (in fact, at all quantiles) in favor of the one-sided alternative that
12We are grateful to Kishore Gawande for kindly providing us with the data.
13All the estimation in this study is done by using a MATLAB code written by Christian Hansen (available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/christian.hansen/reserach).
16￿ (￿) > 0. Moreover, the point estimates indicate that contrary to the PFS prediction, the ￿ (￿)
are all negative at high quantiles and decrease as ￿ goes from 0:4 to 0:9, and some of them are
statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level.
Note that ￿ and ￿ are estimated to be zero at the 0:1-0:4 quantiles. This suggests that the
corner solution (T = 0) greatly a⁄ects the estimates at lower quantiles. From this evidence, it is
conjectured that the existence of corners also a⁄ects the estimates at the mean. Thus, ￿ndings
based on the linear model (i.e., equation (3)) in GB, Bombardini (2005), and others are likely to
be subject to bias due to the corner solution problem. In contrast, our method does not su⁄er
from the problem, since the focus is mainly on the higher quantiles where the e⁄ect of corner
solution is minimal. In addition, our method has a distinct advantage over the other estimation
strategy in the literature. To address the corner solution problem, several studies (e.g., Goldberg
and Maggi, 1999; Facchini et al., 2006) estimate a system of equations: equation (4) as well as
an import penetration equation and an equation for political organization. While dealing with
the existence of corners, this strategy requires the joint normality assumption on the error terms
which potentially a⁄ects the estimation results. In contrast, our results are not driven by the
parametric assumption on the error term; it is not required by the quantile regression.14
One might wish to control for various factors as well. Following GB, we control for tari⁄of in-
termediate goods (INTERMTAR) and NTB coverage of intermediate goods (INTERMNTB).
As column (2) of Table 2 shows, our main ￿ndings do not change; ￿ (￿) still decreases (for the
most part) from zero to a negative value with the increase in ￿, contrary to what the PFS
model predicts. ￿ and ￿ are found to be zero at the 0:1 and 0:2 quantiles, again suggesting the
importance of corner solution.
14Of course, these advantages come with a cost. That is, the quantile approach does not allow us to estimate
the structural parameters ￿ and ￿ separately.
175.2 IV Quantile Regression Results
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (8). Our choice of instruments is guided
by GB where they used 34 distinct instruments, their quadratic terms, and some of the two-
term cross products. We use a subset of their instruments (17 instruments) indicated in Table 1.
These are also used in Bombardini (2005) as the basic instruments.15 First, we use two sets of in-
struments. Instrument set 1 consists of the 17 instruments, their squared terms, INTERMTAR
and INTERMNTB and their squared terms. Instrument set 2 includes instrument set 1 and
their interaction terms. The IV quantile results for the instrument set 1 are reported in column
(1) of Table 3. As in the quantile regression, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ￿(0:9) = 0
in favor of the one-sided alternative. The point estimates are not favorable for the PFS model,
either; even after correcting for the endogeneity of Z, the estimate of ￿ at the highest quantile
is not positive as required by the PFS model. The results remain virtually the same when we
use the instrument set 2 as IV￿ s, as column (2) indicates.
The estimation results where the capital labor ratio is controlled for are presented in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3. ￿ (￿)
0 s are again estimated to be zero at ￿ = 0:1 regardless of whether
we use instrument set 1 or 2. At high quantiles, ￿ (￿)
0 s are estimated to be negative for most
of ￿￿ s . Although the point estimate of ￿ (0:9) is positive when we use instrument set 2, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favor of the one-sided alternative.
Although we use a subset of GB￿ s instruments, our results may be driven by too many
instruments. Thus, we further estimate equation (8) using only one of the following instruments
at a time: SCIENTISTS, MANAGERS, and CROSSELI and using all of them (see Table
1 for their de￿nitions). These instruments are found to be strongly correlated with Z in GB.
The results are presented in columns (5) - (12) of Table 3. The results suggest that having many
instruments a⁄ects the estimates of ￿ (￿). Speci￿cally, the absolute magnitude of the coe¢ cients
15We are grateful to Matilde Bombardini for providing us with the program for her PFS estimation.
18now become far larger than that obtained with the larger number of instruments. Nonetheless,
our main ￿ndings appear to be robust; regardless of which instrument we use and whether we
control for capital-labor ratio, the null hypothesis at the highest quantile cannot be rejected.
Moreover, the point estimates of ￿ (￿) are negative at high quantiles, in fact, they are zero at low
quantiles and negative at any other quantiles, which is inconsistent with the PFS￿ s prediction.
6 Discussion
There are several possible explanations for our results. The ￿rst possibility is heteroskedasticity.
If the error term has higher variance when the industry is politically unorganized, i.e.,
"j = wj + (1 ￿ Ij)￿j; (9)
then politically unorganized industries would have error terms with much higher variance.16 As
a result, they would be the ones that dominate in high quantiles as well as in low quantiles,
whereas the politically organized industries would be found mostly around the median. Hence,
at high quantiles, the negative quantile regression coe¢ cients correspond to ￿, which is negative,
and not ￿ + ￿ > 0. This may explain the presence of negative slope coe¢ cients in the higher









Ij + &j (1 ￿ Ij) + wj:
Importantly, the modi￿ed equation has an additional term 1 ￿ Ij with a random coe¢ cient &j. That is, we need
an error term with a richer stochastic structure to make the model consistent to the data. However, the more we
rely on the complexity of the stochastic structure of the error term instead of the model to ￿t the data, the less
attractive becomes the treatment of the error term as an "add on" to the structural model. And if we decide not
to arbitrarily add an error term to the reduced form of the deterministic model, the original lobbying model needs
to be substantially modi￿ed to explicitly include stochastic shocks so that the reduced form of the stochastic
model results to the modi￿ed equation above. Then, it would be unclear whether ￿ndings in past studies (i.e.,
￿ < 0, ￿ > 0, and ￿ + ￿ > 0) can be interpreted as being in support of the PFS paradigm.
19quantiles. The possibility cannot be completely ruled out. However, given that almost all
industries have positive campaign contributions and both GM and GB report that more than
half of the industries are politically organized, it is reasonable to think that a signi￿cant fraction
of the industries are likely to be politically organized. In that case, it is surprising to ￿nd that
the slope coe¢ cients of the quantile regressions are negative at almost all quantiles except for
the zeros at low quantiles, which comes from the corners.
Second, the small sample may make it di¢ cult for our approach to provide evidence favoring
the PFS model. This problem can be overcome by using more disaggregated data, although
such an exercise is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Third, note that if the political organization were correctly assigned in GB, as argued above,
then our results are not inconsistent with those of GB. Recall that in our simple example where
we computed the relationship between the equilibrium campaign contribution and z=e for polit-
ically organized industries, it was positive instead of negative. If the positive relationship holds
in reality, we argued that the industries that were originally classi￿ed as politically organized
should be classi￿ed as unorganized and vice versa, so that the true results of the GB protection
equation estimation should be b ￿ > 0, b ￿ < 0 and b ￿ +b ￿ < 0, which is indeed consistent with our
quantile regression and quantile IV results.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and implemented a new test of the PFS model that does not require
data on political organizations. The ￿ndings so far are not supportive of the PFS model. Clearly,
more work is needed on this. One fruitful research avenue might be to look at countries other
than the United States using our approach as it does not require data on political organization.
Another research avenue is to use more disaggregated data so that our approach can provide
20statistically more clear-cut evidence. Finally, other predictions of the PFS model such as those
on equilibrium contribution levels predicted by the PFS model relative to actual contributions
need to be tested.
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24Appendix 1: Quantile Regression
Proposition 1 (Quantile Regression) Assume that (1) Zj is bounded below by a positive
number, i.e. there exists Z > 0 such that Zj ￿ Z, (2) ￿j has a smooth density function which
has support that is bounded from above and below, (3) ￿j is independent of both Zj and and Ij,
and (4) ￿ > 0. Then, for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1, ￿ quantile conditional on Zj can be expressed
as




+ (￿ + ￿)Zj (10)
where
￿0 =
￿ ￿ P (Ij = 0)
P (Ij = 1)
: (11)







￿j ￿ T ￿ ￿Zj
￿
P (Ij = 0) + P
￿
￿j ￿ T ￿ (￿ + ￿)Zj
￿






+ (￿ + ￿)Zj (13)
where
￿0 =
￿ ￿ P (Ij = 0)
P (Ij = 1)
, or ￿ = P (Ij = 0) + ￿0P (Ij = 1). (14)
From equation (14), we can see that for ￿ % 1, ￿0 % 1 as well. Hence, for ￿ su¢ ciently close to
















+ (￿ + ￿)Zj > F￿1















￿j ￿ T ￿ ￿Zj
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= 1. (15)











P (Ij = 1)
= P(Ij = 0) + ￿ ￿ P (Ij = 0) = ￿.
Therefore, for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1,




+ (￿ + ￿)Zj.
We make two remarks on the assumptions. First, we assume that ￿j has bounded support
(assumption 2). This assumption is reasonable since the protection measure is usually derived
from the NTB coverage ratio (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay,
2000) and therefore it is clearly bounded above and below. Second, we assume that ￿j is
independent of both Zj and and Ij (assumption 3). This is rather a strong assumption and will
be relaxed next. In particular, we allow Zj to be correlated with ￿j.
Assume the model is as follows:
T￿
j = ￿Zj + ￿j if Ij = 0
T￿
j = (￿ + ￿)Zj + ￿j if Ij = 1
where
Zj = g (Wj;vj).
Wj is an instrument vector and vj is a random variable independent of Wj. We will show that
￿ (￿) ! (￿ + ￿) > 0 as ￿ % 1.
26Let us de￿ne uj as follows:
￿j = E [￿jjvj] + uj; uj ￿ ￿j ￿ E [￿jjvj],
where uj is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both uj







Then, for Ij = 0 the model satis￿es the assumptions A1-A5 of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006).





￿ (￿) + ￿ZjjWj
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￿ (￿) + (￿ + ￿)ZjjWj
￿
= ￿ for Ij = 1.
Proposition 2 (Quantile IV) Assume that Zj is bounded below by a positive number, i.e.
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P (Ij = 0) + ￿0P (Ij = 1):
From the de￿nition of ￿0, for ￿ % 1, ￿0 % 1 as well. Because ￿ is uniformly bounded, for ￿
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= P(Ij = 0) + ￿0P (Ij = 1) = ￿.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 2: Quantile Regression Results
(1) (2)
￿ (quantile) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿(￿)
0:1 0:000 (0:004) 0:000 (0:056) 0:000 (0:013) 0:000 (0:060)
0:2 0:000 (0:005) 0:000 (0:079) 0:000 (0:017) 0:000 (0:080)
0:3 0:000 (0:006) 0:000 (0:091) ￿0:026 (0:014) ￿0:099 (0:153)
0:4 0:000 (0:006) 0:000 (0:097) ￿0:029 (0:014) ￿0:020 (0:092)
0:5 0:002 (0:006) ￿0:003 (0:099) ￿0:026 (0:014) ￿0:032 (0:094)
0:6 0:028 (0:006) ￿0:046 (0:098) ￿0:053 (0:024) ￿0:082 (0:093)
0:7 0:077 (0:010) ￿0:126 (0:095) ￿0:044 (0:017) ￿0:125 (0:090)
0:8 0:157 (0:026) ￿0:258 (0:094) ￿0:046 (0:018) ￿0:145 (0:086)
0:9 0:308 (0:040) ￿0:505 (0:089) ￿0:001 (0:021) ￿0:225 (0:075)
GB Controls No Yes
Note: This table provides the estimation results of equation (7). Standard errors are in
parentheses. GB Controls indicate whether INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB are con-
trolled for. For the de￿nition of these vriables, see Table 1.
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